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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
DAWN ALUMBAUGH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

i

vs.

:

UTAH STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT,
by and through its Commissioner
and Authorized Representative,
HAROLD C. YANCEY,
Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 920656-CA

:
:

Category No. 15

:

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE UTAH STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp.
1992).
Utah

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1992), and

Code

Ann.

§78-2a-3(2)(k)

(Supp.

1992),

this

Court

has

jurisdiction over this appeal by reason of the transfer of this
action from the Supreme Court of Utah to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Has Dawn Alumbaugh failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This matter was decided below upon a

motion to dismiss, and the material facts are not in dispute.
Because this issue raises only questions of law, the' Court should
give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a
correctness standard. City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co. . 796
P.2d 697 (Utah 1990).

2.

Are Dawn Alumbaugh's contractual and constitutional claims,

alleging failure to afford adequate due process, ripe for judicial
consideration when the procedural process being chall-enged has not
been concluded?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
3.

Is the State of Utah, and its Insurance Department,

"persons" such as can be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
4. Does a private, civil, cause of action exist under Article
1, Section 7, for a state employee to sue her employer for alleged
constitutional violations?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review i§ the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
5.

Has Dawn Alumbaugh, a merit employee, failed to state a

contractual cause of action against her employer, the State of
Utah?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The Standard of Review is the same as

that for the first issue, supra.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1989)
A Claim against the state, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the attorney general and the agency
concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any
2

extension of time granted under Section 63-3011, regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 (1989)
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff
shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by
the court, but in no case less than the sum of
$300/ conditioned upon the payment by the
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the
governmental entity in the action if the
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or
fails to recover judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Dawn Alumbaugh/ an employee of the Defendant, Utah State
Insurance

Department,

commenced

an

administrative

grievance

proceeding with her employer concerning Alumbaugh's transfer to a
new position, at the same payf within the Department.

When Ms.

Alumbaugh appealed the denial of that grievance to the Career
Service Review Board/ the Administrator issued a summary decision
dismissing the appeal on the grounds that the Board did not have
jurisdiction to hear Ms. Alumbaugh's appeal. R. 47-54.
sought

Alumbaugh

judicial review of that dismissal in this Court.

In

Alumbaugh v. White. 800 P. 2d 825 (Utah App. 1990), this Court
determined that/ in as much as the challenged administrative action
was an informal proceeding, that this Court transferred the action
to the District Court, where it should have been brought initially.
While her petition for judicial review was proceeding in the
trial court, Ms. Alumbaugh then brought this action in the District
Court as well.

The trial court granted the defendant's motion to

dismiss on the basis of Dawn Alumbaugh's failure to exhaust her
3

administrative and statutory remedies•
filed the instant appeal.

R. 123-4.

Plaintiff then

R. 125-6.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff

was employed

by the Utah State Department of

Insurance as a Grade 15 Insurance Technician in the Department's
Solvency Division.

R. 65 at para. 2.

On or about April 3, 1990,

Ms. Alumbaugh was transferred to a Grade 15 Insurance Technician
position in the Department's Market Conduct Division.

R. 67-8 at

para. 8.
On

or

about

administrative
involuntary.

April

grievance

6,

1990,

challenging

Ms.
this

Alumbaugh
transfer

filed
as

an

being

R. 68 at para. 9. The State of Utah's Department of

Insurance denied that grievance. When Ms. Alumbaugh appealed the
denial of that grievance to the Career Service Review Board, the
Administrator issued a summary decision dismissing the appeal on
the grounds that the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear Ms.
Alumbaugh's appeal. R. 47-54.
Alumbaugh sought judicial review of that dismissal in this
Court.

In Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990), this

Court determined that, in as much as the challenged administrative
action was an informal proceeding, that this Court transferred the
action to the District Court, where it should have been brought
initially.
Without

awaiting

a

final

resolution

of

her

grievance

procedure, plaintiff filed the instant action alleging that her
constitutional rights to due process were violated under both the
4

federal and state constitutions. The sole defendant in this action
is the "Utah State Insurance Department."1 R. 64 at para. 2. This
action was assigned to Judge Richard H. Moffat.

Judge Moffat

dismissed the instant action on July 10, 1992 without prejudice
because the plaintiff had failed to exhaust her remedies in her
prior action before Judge Young before filing this separate action.
Ms.

Alumbaugh's

petition

for

judicial

review

of

the

administrative grievance process has yet to be resolved., Ms.
Alumbaugh, after the dismissal of the instant action, obtained the
dismissal without prejudice of her petition for judicial review
"for the reason that Alumbaugh wishes to hold such Petition in
abeyance pending the determination of her rights in this Appeal."
Brief of Appellant at page 15, para. 28.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Dawn Alumbaugh, a merit employee of the State of Utah, filed
an administrative grievance concerning that employment. When that
grievance had progressed to the judicial review stage, and before
the process was completed, Ms. Alumbaugh filed the instant action
alleging that her contractual, state, and federal constitutional
rights to due process had been violated by the manner in which her
grievance was handled.
The instant action is premature, and was properly dismissed

1

While the caption of the instant action alleges that the
Defendant Utah State Insurance Department is being sued "by and
through its Commissioner and Authorized Representative HAROLD C.
YANCEY," the complaint, amended complaint, and the brief of
appellant all make it very clear that the one and only defendant in
this matter is the State of Utah's Department of Insurance.

5

pending Ms. Alumbaugh's exhaustion of her administrative remedies.
Until a final decision is reached in plaintiff's administrative
matter, this Court is left to speculate and conjecture as to what
due process will have been afforded the plaintiff. Where, as here,
a plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the administrative due
process she has been afforded, her claim is not justiciable until
the challenged proceedings are final and complete.
The "Utah State Insurance Department," the only defendant, is
not a person as that term is used in section 1983 •

For

this

reason, the plaintiff's civil rights cause of action was properly
dismissed.
No private cause of action exists under the State of Utah's
Constitution for a claim by a merit employee that she has been
denied her rights to procedural due process in an administrative
grievance hearing.

The legislature has expressly provided for

judicial review of such hearings. This is the existing avenue for
addressing such claims of constitutional wrongdoing.
As a civil service merit employee, Ms. Alumbaugh's employment
is governed by statute, and not an alleged implied contract.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF'S INSTANT ACTION WAS PROPERLY
DISMISSED
FOR
FAILURE
TO
EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND BECAUSE HER CLAIMS
ARE NOT YET RIPE FOR JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION
All of the plaintiff's claims arise out the same actions and
allegations that were properly before the Third District Court, the
Honorable David S. Young, in plaintiff's petition for judicial
review of her grievance proceeding.
6

That matter is now "in

abeyance," due to the plaintiff's actions, pending the outcome of
the instant appeal.

It has not been finally adjudicated. Judge

Moffat correctly dismissed the instant action as being premature.
The issues raised in this action cannot fully be addressed until
the prior judicial review action is completed. Until such time as
that judicial review process has been completed, the instant action
before Judge Moffat was not ripe for judicial determination. Judge
Moffat correctly dismissed this action without prejudice for this
reason, and such dismissal should be affirmed, now, on appeal, for
the same reason.
The issues of fact and law that the plaintiff raised in the
instant proceeding, are of necessity the same or similar to those
that are raised in her petition for judicial review. This Supreme
Court of Utah has held that administrative remedies must be
exhausted before a party may bring an independent judicial action.
Hi-Country Homeowners v. PSC of Utah, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 1989).
See also; State, Dept. of Social Services v. Hiqqs, 656 P.2d 998
(Utah 1982), Levie v. Sevier County, 617 P.2d 331 (Utah 1980),
Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dept., 685 P.2d 550 (Utah 1984).
The instant action is duplicative. The key issues of fact and
law that are presented by this action will be decided in the
petition for judicial review.
action has been made.

No final determination in that

It has instead been placed on hold pending

the result in this action.

Until the review process has been

completed, there can be no complete set of facts upon which to
adjudicate the instant action.

A controversy is not ripe for
7

judicial determination unless the facts on which a legal decision
is demanded have accrued,

"The court will not declare rights on

facts which have not arisen or adjudicate matters which are
contingent, uncertain, or

rest

in

the

future."

26 C.J.S.

Declaratory Judgments § 28 at pages 103-104.
In her instant, second, action, the plaintiff alleges that she
was denied due process under both the constitutions of the United
States and of the State of Utah.

Such a claim cannot be ripe for

independent judicial adjudication until the original review of the
administrative

proceeding

she

challenges

is

completed.

The

plaintiff's petition for judicial review of her grievance action
has not been prosecuted to a final result.
concluded.

It has not been

The facts as to what due process has been afforded the

plaintiff are still contingent and uncertain.

The facts may very

well change as the petition for judicial review moves through the
courts.

It was premature for the plaintiff to file the instant,

independent, action before a final resolution was had in her prior
proceeding.
A fundamental principle of judicial review is
that, when possible, we refrain from deciding
constitutional questions. This is especially
true when there is no factual record before
us.
State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1990)
(citations omitted).

No complete factual record concerning due

process could be obtained in this action until the prior petition
for judicial review reaches a final adjudication. Until that time
the court is left with conjecture and speculation as the only means

8

of determining what exact due process will have been afforded to
the plaintiff.
In Neighborhood Ass'n v. Planning & Zoning Com'n, 888 F.2d
1573 (11th Cir. 1989) the court affirmed a dismissal of procedural
due process claims on the grounds that those claims were not yet
ripe. As in the instant action, the plaintiffs in Neighborhood had
brought their civil rights action before completing the procedural
process that they alleged was defective.
The final outcome of plaintiff's administrative and judicial
review proceeding is still unknown.
review

proceeding,

administrative

may

body

yet:

for

The courts, in the judicial

remand

further

that

matter

hearings,

to

the

reverse

the

administrative decision, or affirm the administrative decision.
Until the judicial review petition filed by the ,plaintiff is
resolved, her effort to file a second, independent, matter was
premature and was correctly dismissed by Judge Moffat as being
premature and for failure to exhaust her available remedies.
The only case law cited by the plaintiff, in her effort to
claim that

she does not need to complete the administrative

proceeding in order to present a complete factual situation as to
what due process was provided, is Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 828 P.2d 1071 (Utah App. 1992).

Plaintiff does not specify

how this Court's opinion applies to the present action, but simply
claims that it supports her arguments.
question

of

whether

a

former

Hatton-Ward involved the

employee

must

first

file

an

administrative grievance before filing an independent action under
9

the whistle blower statute,

Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-1, et seq..

This Court held that, as an independent cause of action, there was
no requirement that an administrative grievance be filed before
proceeding under the whistle blower statute.

In Hatton-Ward the

plaintiff did not claim that his rights had been violated by the
manner in which any administrative proceeding was taken against
him.

The plaintiff instead claimed that his termination was

contrary to an independent statutory provision.
Further, in Hatton-Ward, the Court expressly pointed out that
Mr. Hatton-Ward was not seeking reinstatement or any other relief
related to the administrative grievance process.

Instead, it was

the defendant who claimed that the plaintiff must first go through
the administrative process before filing a separate, distinct,
cause of action unrelated in any manner to the administrative
process.

But Ms. Alumbaugh, rather than bringing an entirely

-separate cause of action, is instead claiming that she was denied
contractual, state, and federal constitutional due process in. the
administrative grievance process.
Plaintiff alleges that her constitutional and contractual
rights to due process were violated by the manner in which the
prior administrative proceeding was handled. Her current, second,
action alleges that the administrative process she was given
violated her constitutional rights under both the state and federal
constitutions,

and

employment contract.

her

contractual

rights

under

an

implied

Unlike a claim under the whistle blower

statute, the current action of necessity is intertwined and
10

entangled

in

administrative

the

facts

and

proceeding.

law

that

is

applicable

Because that process

to

the

is not yet

completed, but is "in abeyance" awaiting a final resolution of this
matter before plaintiff completes her petition for judicial review,
any claim that such an ongoing process has violated her rights is
premature and has not yet ripened into a justiciable controversy.
Plaintiff

tries to avoid

this

conclusion

by

seeking to

downplay the importance of her ongoing petition for judicial review
of the administrative process.

Plaintiff claims that her current

attorney has determined that even if she prevails in her prior
action, that no meaningful relief would be available. This belief
does not alter the fact that the instant action is premature.

It

doesn't change the reality that the facts upon which the current
action is based are still contingent, uncertain, and rest on the
future course of proceedings in plaintiff's petition for judicial
review that is still outstanding. It simply raises questions about
why the prior action is being pursued if plaintiff feels that it is
meaningless.
II. THE STATE OF UTAH AND ITS DEPARTMENT OF
INSURANCE ARE NOT 'PERSONS' PURSUANT TO 42
U.S.C. S 1983 SUCH AS CAN BE SUED
The Amended Complaint alleges violations of the Plaintiff's
civil rights and seeks recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. It is
clearly established law that neither the State of Utah or its
Department of Insurance are "persons" pursuant to §1983 and cannot
therefore be sued thereunder.
In its most recent case, the United States Supreme Court made
11

it abundantly clear that the several states cannot be sued under
§1983 in state courts. In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989), the Court held that the State of Michigan
and its department of state police could not be sued in Michigan
State Court for civil rights violations.
Our conclusion is further supported by our
holdings that in enacting §1983, Congress did
not intend to override well-established
immunities or defenses under the common law.
"One important assumption underlying -the
court's decisions in this area is that members
of the 42nd Congress were familiar with
common-law principles, including defenses
previously
recognized
in
ordinary
tort
litigation, and that they likely intended
these common-law principles to obtain, absent
specific
provisions
to
the
contrary."
(Citations omitted).
The doctrine of
sovereign immunity was a familiar doctrine at
common law. "The principle is elementary that
a State cannot be sued in its own courts
without its consent," It is an "established
principle of jurisprudence" that the sovereign
cannot be sued in its own courts without its
consent. We cannot conclude that §1983 was
intended to disregard the well-established
immunity of a State from being sued without
its consent.
109 S.Ct. at 2309-2310, citations omitted.

The State of Utah has

expressly declared that it does not waive its immunity as to civil
rights claims.

§63-30-10(1)(b) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.

Therefore,

State

the

of

Utah

and

the

Utah

State

Insurance

Department were properly dismissed from this action as far as
allegations of violations of Section 1983 are contained in the
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
Plaintiff erroneously states that the State of Utah, or its
Department of Insurance, can be named a defendant in this action
12

for the limited purpose of prospective injunctive relief and for
the award of attorneys fees.

The United States Supreme Court has

continuously held that the states are not subject to such actions,
regardless of the nature of the relief sought.

Atascadero State

Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S.Ct. 3142, reh. den. 106
S.Ct. 18 (1985); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, (1984); Florida Department of Health v. Florida
Nursing Home Association, 450 U.S. 147 (1981);

Alabama v. Pugh,

438 U.S. 781 (1978); and Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933).
Indeed, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) expressly held that
the State of Kentucky could not be brought into a damages action
against one of its employees for the sole purpose of an award of
attorneys fees.
Plaintiff seeks to circumvent this well established point of
law by claiming that "injunctive relief may be ordered against a
state under Section 1983. Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. at 71, note
10."

Brief of Appellant at page 23.

The footnote cited by Ms.

Alumbaugh does not state that a sovereign state is a "person" as
that term is used under section 1983. Instead, the footnote points
out, in part, that:
Of course a State official in his or her
official capacity, when sued for injunctive
relief, would be a person under § 1983 because
"official-capacity actions for prospective
relief are not treated as actions against the
State." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S., at 167,
n. 14, 105 S.Ct., at 3106, n. 14; Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160, 28 S.Ct. 441,
453-454, 52 L.Ed.
714
(1908).
This
distinction is "commonplace in sovereign
immunity doctrine," . . . .
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Id.. The footnote clearly does not support plaintiff's claim that
the State of Utah, or its Department of Insurance, would be a
"person" such as can be sued under section 1983 for prospective
relief. Ms. Alumbaugh has not sought to bring an official capacity
action against the appropriate state officials.
The only defendant has always been the "Utah State Insurance
Department."

It has been clearly decided by the courts that a

state's agencies are entitled to the same immunity as is the state
itself.

See Schaefer v. Wilcock, 676 F.Supp. 1092, 1097-1098 (D.

Utah) (dismissing action against the Utah Highway Patrol); Alabama
v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (State Department of Corrections);
Hamilton

v. Menqel,

629

F.Supp.

1110, 1113

(D. Utah

1986)

(dismissing action against Utah State Tax Commission); Richins v.
Industrial Construction, Inc., 502 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1974)
(reversing award of damages against Utah State Road Commission).
III. PLAINTIFF CANNOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1, SECTION 7
OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
Alumbaugh's Third Cause of Action seeks to allege a private,
civil, cause of action for a purported violation of Article 1,
Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution, which states that "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.••
Plaintiff's state law cause of action, if any, against the
State of Utah's

Insurance Department is subject to the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act, which provides at Utah Code Ann. §63-3012:
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A claim against the state, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the Attorney General and the agency
concerned within one year after the claim
arises. • . .
The statutory language above is clear and unambiguous.

Where, as

here, suit is brought against an agency of the State of Utah, a
condition precedent to bringing suit is the filing of a timely
notice of claim with the State agency involved and the Office of
the Attorney General.

If this is not done, suit is barred.

It is undisputed that the record in the instant action shows
that no notice of claim was filed with the Office of the Attorney
General or with the agency concerned before this action was
commenced.
The Supreme Court of Utah has ruled on numerous occasions that
full compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder.
In Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah
1975), the Court addressed the statute that mandates the filing of
a timely notice of claim when suing a political subdivision of the
State of Utah. §63-30-13 Utah Code Ann. is virtually identical to
§63-30-12.
In dismissing an action against a School District where the
notice of claim was not filed in a timely manner, the Court
explained:
The School District is a political subdivision
of the state. Therefore it would normally be
immune from suit; and the right to sue is an
15

exception created by statute.
We have
consistently held that where a cause of action
is based upon a statute, full compliance with
its requirements is a condition precedent to
the right to maintain a suit.
Id. at 482.

See also, Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 £.2d 925, 926

(Utah 1977); Sears v. Southworth v. State, 563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah
1977); Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d
1286 (1973).
The Supreme Court of Utah has also ruled that the failure
to allege compliance with the notice requirement, as the Plaintiff
has failed to do in the instant action, may constitute a separate
ground

f<?r

dismissal.

Roosendaal

Construction

and

Mining

Corporation v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972).
Applying these cases to the instant action, the State of Utah
submits that plaintiff has failed to comply with section 63-30-12.
Plaintiff needed to file notices of claim with both* the Attorney
'General's Office and the agency concerned.

This she has failed to

do. This shortcoming deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over
plaintiff's claims against the State of Utah's Insurance Department
and this action was properly dismissed.
Plaintiff's claims are also subject to Utah Code Ann. §63-3019, which provides:
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff
shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by
the court, but in no case less than the sum of
$300, conditioned upon the payment by the
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the
governmental entity in the action if the
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or
fails to recover judgment.
Where, as here, suit is brought against the State of Utah, a
16

condition

precedent

to bringing

statutorily mandated undertaking.

suit

is

the

filing

of the

If this is not done, suit is

barred.
While not binding upon this Court, the State of Utah calls
this Court's attention to the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Rippstein v. City of Provo, 929 F.2d 576 (10th Cir.
1991).

In Rippstein, the federal appellate court held that the

undertaking required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 must be filed
contemporaneously with the complaint in order to be timely filed
under this statute. Because the plaintiff in Rippstein did not so
file an undertaking, but only sought to file one at a later time,
the action was dismissed.

The Court held that the failure to file

could not be remedied by an attempt to file an undertaking late.
At no time in the instant action, did plaintiff seek to file
the required undertaking.

For this reason, plaintiff's claims

against the State of Utah were properly dismissed.2
Even disregarding the State of Utah's sovereign immunity,
Alumbaugh has failed to state a cause of action under this
constitutional provision.

The provision does not establish a

separate, constitutional, cause of action for civil damages. The
Utah

State

Legislature,

and

not

Ms.

Alumbaugh,

has

the

constitutional mandate to determine how to enforce this provision.
That Ms. Alumbaugh wishes that the Legislature had provided a civil
2

While Plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act were not addressed below,
this is a jurisdictional question that can be raised at any time in
the proceeding by either party or the court. LaMarr v. Utah State
Dept. of Transportation, 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah App. 1992).
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remedy is of no consequence.
In support of her claim that such a direct cause of action
exists under the Utah State Constitution, plaintiff cites to a
single case, Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dept., 616 P.2d 598 (Utah
1980).

Defendant

is

perplexed,

Alumbaugh's reliance on this case.

to

say

the

least, by Ms.

At no time does the majority

decision in Worrall even cite to Article 1, Section .7 of the Utah
State Constitution, as far as defendant has been able to determine.
Worrall was a petition for judicial review of an administrative
determination to fire an Ogden City fireman in which the Court held
that the due process afforded in the administrative proceeding had
not met the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
At no time did either the majority or dissenting opinions
address the question of the whether or not Article 1, Section 7 of
the Utah State Constitution created a private constitutional tort
action.

The only citation to this section in Worrall that the

State of Utah is aware of is footnote two of the dissenting opinion
of Justice Hall.

.Id. at page 602.

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur, of Narc,
403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), the Supreme Court of the United
States did, indeed, create a federal cause of action directly under
the federal constitution for damages against a federal officer who
violates an individual's constitutional rights.

At no time did

Bivens create any cause of action against state officers or
employees.
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Indeed, not all federal officers are susceptible to Bivens
actions.

In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362

(1983), the Court refused to create a Bivens action for enlisted
military personnel against their superior officers.

In reaching

this decision, the Court explained:
This Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
supra, authorized a suit for damages against
federal officials whose actions violate an
individual's
constitutional
rights, even
though Congress had not expressly authorized
such suits.
The Court, in Bivens and its
progeny, has expressly cautioned, however,
that such a remedy will not be available when
"special factors counselling hesitation" are
present.
462 U.S. at 298.

In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 19, 100 S.Ct. 1468

(1980) the Court explained that a second reason for not creating
such a direct cause of action judicially was where the legislature
had explicitly acted and created a substitute cause of action that
is meaningful and adequate.
The majority of federal courts, following Bivens, have held
that

where

a plaintiff

has

an

appropriate

statutory

remedy

available for an alleged violation of a constitutional provision,
no cause of action may be brought directly under the constitution.3
Whether a plaintiff actually maintains or prevails on an action
3

See Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496 (6th Cir.), reh'g on
other grounds 829 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1987); Williams v. Bennett,
689 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1982), cert, den., 464 U.S. 392 (1983);
Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1981); Hearth, Inc. v.
Dept. of Public Welfare, 617 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1980); Turpin v.
Mailet, 591 F.2d 426, 427 (2nd Cir. 1979) (en banc); Cale v. City
of Covington, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978); Mahone v. Waddle, 564
F.2d 1018, 1025 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert, den., 438 U.S. 904 (1978);
Koska v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1977).
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under the available statutory provision is immaterial.
In the instant case, the Utah State Legislature has provided
just such a substitute remedy. Plaintiff has available to her the
adequate

statutory

remedies

under

the

Utah

State

Personnel

Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-1 et sea. (1986 & Supp.
1992).

Rather than seek her relief through that legislatively

created procedure, the plaintiff has put her statutory cause of
action "in abeyance" while she asks this Court to create a new
cause to replace that provided by the legislature.
The United States Supreme Court addressed this very question
in Bush v. Lucas. 462 U.S. 386, 103 S.Ct. 2404 (1983),

Bush

involved a federal employee's attempt to have the Court create a
Bivens type action against the federal government for violations of
constitutional rights in the federal employment relationship. The
plaintiff alleged that he had his constitutional rights violated in
the

manner

that

he

was

disciplined

by

his

supervisor

plaintiff's exercise of his right to free speech.

for

The United

States Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's argument, finding
that the legislatively created civil service remedies were an
adequate substitute remedy.
The Bush Court, on the federal level, expressly rejected the
very claim for a direct constitutional tort cause of action that is
presented by Ms. Alumbaugh.

While not binding on this Court's

interpretation of the Utah Constitution, the State of Utah urges
this Court to adopt the rationale presented by the U.S. Supreme
Court, that the civil service remedy was an adequate substitute
20

remedy and that any direct cause of action would be contrary to
good public policy.
Indeed, Ms. Alumbaughrs cause of action, if permitted by the
Court, would be unique. She does not allege that the statutes that
govern her employment are unconstitutional.

She does not allege

that the procedural provisions of those statutes have not been
followed in her case.

And yet she alleges, without specificity,

that her rights to due process have been violated.
If Ms. Alumbaugh claims that the procedures of the applicable
statutes have not been complied with, and thus her rights to due
process have been violated, she has a remedy by seeking judicial
review of the administrative proceeding. On such review, the court
can easily order the administrative body to comply with the
procedural requirements of the statutes.
If, on the other hand, Ms. Alumbaugh claims that the statutes
themselves do not afford adequate due process, she can challenge
the constitutionality of the statutes by seeking judicial review of
the administrative proceeding. Vance v. Fordham 671 P.2d 124 (Utah
1983).
IV. PLAINTIFF CANNOT MAINTAIN HER CONTRACT
CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE
One of the Legislature's few waivers of immunity relates to
State contracts. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (1989). But it does not
apply here.

That Section waives immunity only as to the State's

"contractual obligations]."

Since Alumbaugh has no contract with

the State, but is instead a statutory merit employee of the State
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of Utah, she cannot

invoke that waiver.4

The State's only

agreement with Dawn Alumbaugh is found in the statutory provisions
of the Utah State Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-191 et sea. (1986 & Supp. 1992).
The Legislature never intended to waive immunity under Section
63-30-5 except as to one who has privity of contract with the
government,

or

who

specifically

is

the

contract's

intended

beneficiary. Alumbaugh enjoys no such privity of contract with the
State. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the performance of a
duty imposed by statute is insufficient consideration to support a
contract. . Prows v. State of Utah, 822 P.2d 764, 768 (Utah 1991).
Alumbaugh cannot use Section 63-30-5 to sue under her alleged
contract of employment that is, in reality, a claim for statutory
entitlement.
Plaintiff is a Career Service employee under the state merit
system as are all other merit employees in state employment.

The

Utah Legislature has established the laws and the Department of
Human Resource Management has established the rules (interpreting
those statutes) upon which Ms. Alumbaugh's employment is based.
Plaintiff is not a "contract" employee with the State of Utah and
garners any protection she has in said employment through the
statutes referred to above, not through a separate employment
contract.
*
Section 63-30-5 states:
"Immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation.
Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations shall not
be subject to the requirements of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12,
63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15, or 63-30-19."
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There is no independent contract between the parties, either
explicit or implied.

If such existed, they are null and void and

outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

In Thurston v. Box Elder

County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992), both parties presented the case
to the Court on the basis of whether the county had violated its
personnel manual. The Court, sua sponte, rejected this formulation
of the issues, and addressed instead whether or not the termination
of a civil servant had been proper under the applicable statutes.
The Court expressly held that the county did not have a right to
alter

the

statutory

provisions

that

governed

its

personnel

policies.
Jurisdictions which have dealt with this issue have clearly
enunciated that "public employees" under merit systems maintain
their positions by laws and rules and not by contract. The Oregon
Court of Appeals in Personnel Division v. St. Clair, 498 P.2d 809
(Or. App. 1972) held that:
Respondent's arguments concerning "vested
contractual rights" and "impairment of the
obligation of contracts," in which they
endeavor to apply the general law of contracts
to the present case, are based on the
erroneous assumption that the employment
relationship between the State of Oregon and
its civil service employees arises out of, or
results in, a contract between the parties.
The terms and conditions of civil service
employment are fixed by statute and the
regulations of the state personnel agency, and
not by "contract" between the public employer
and the individual employee.
498 P.2d at 811 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

In Smith v.

City of Newark, 320 A.2d 212 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974) the Court
rejected a government employee's contractual claim,, holding that
23

the

terms

and

conditions

of

public

employment

are

set

in

legislative policy and not in contract.
In Lamborn v. Jessop, 631 P. 2d 917 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court determined that retention of public office is a
matter of legislative control, and not a matter of contract.
Plaintiff relies solely on Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State
College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) in support of her claim that a
civil service employee can state a contractual claim against her
employer.

This reliance is misplaced.

Piacitelli involved an

employee of Southern Utah State College whose employment was
terminated early in 1980.

At that time, officers, faculty, and

other employees of state universities and other state institutions
of higher education were expressly, by statute, declared not to be
civil service merit employees.
(1986).

As

Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-15(1)(g)

the Court pointed

therefore, construing

out in Piacitelli,

a contract, not declaring

constitutional rights."

JEcL at 1066.

"We are,

statutory or

Unlike Piapitelli, Dawn

Alumbaugh is a merit employee, and her employment rights are
therefore found in the statutes enacted by the legislature, and not
in any alleged implied contract.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly dismissed Ms. Alumbaugh's complaint
against the State of Utah's Department of Insurance. The Utah State
Department of Insurance urges this Court to affirm the trial
court's order of dismissal.
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